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FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF ENGINE ROOM FIRES 
SUMMARY 
The first thing that comes to mind when the risk is mentioned is the emergence of a 
negative event. Negative events affect people’s life negatively. During determination 
of risks, time interval, frequency at this time interval, and effects of risk are 
important parameters. The question of how the risk can be controlled is the main 
basis of risk management process. The major obstacle at the risk management 
process is unknown or unpredictable events. Risk is generally determined in the light 
of knowledge and gains acquired from past accidental events. Accident and event 
reports, experiences and expert views take part in the risk management process. Main 
purpose while managing risks is the prevention of risks, if it cannot be prevented, it 
must be kept under control and cost is reduced to minimum level. When viewed form 
this aspect, considering risk as a gain is beneficial. Risk is a time-dependent concept. 
As follows, past hazardous events pose almost no risk nowadays or pose minimum 
risk. The main factors of this situation are technological advances, new rules in force, 
increasing importance on human education. However, new risk areas have emerged 
and will continue to emerge with technological advances. It can be deduced from 
hence that “Risk has always existed and will continue to be existed in future.” Some 
of the risks have disappeared but new risks have gone into our lives. The first of the 
most important areas affected by the risk is human life, the second one is 
environmental damages and the third one is financial losses. Human life is above all 
of them. Disregarding human life for the sake of pecuniary advantage does not fit to 
engineering ethics. In determining the measures to be taken to protect human life, 
there is a need of rule-making organizations and legal sanctions. IMO and ILO are 
working in accordance with this purpose. In addtion, IACS and Lloyds exist in 
accordance with this purpose. To make quick decisions in managing risk and to put 
these decisions into force as soon as possible are essential. Therefore, 
aforementioned institutions make meeting at regular intervals, determine 
contemporary risks and make decisions for the disposal of these risks. In determining 
risks, risk assessment methods are needed. Nowadays many risk assessment methods 
are available. Some of these methods are “primary risk analysis using checklists, 
what if? analysis, hazard and operability studies (HAZOP), fault tree analysis (FTA), 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), hazard analysis and critical control points 
(HACCP), formal safety assessment (FSA). Beyond these methods, in determining 
the risk, the question of which risks will be addressed first is significant. In 
determining the risks, one of the biggest mistakes is to make random evaluations. It 
is very important to make a systematic approach to determine risks. Thus, risk 
assessment becomes more objective. In conjunction with objectivity, risk assessment 
strategies become more transparent. Together with objectivity and transparency, 
adoption of risks and effects of these risks to the rule-making mechanisms becomes 
easier. At ths stage, grading risks objectively is the biggest step. Of course, in 
determining the risks and introducing measures to prevent risks, cost/benefit analysis 
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of these measures must be done. When viewed from this aspect, the problem of 
identifying and controlling risks can be addressed as an optimization problem.   
In this workout, it is aimed to identification of causes, impacts, frequency and 
severity of machnery room accidents and is aimed to preventing or reducing to risk 
of accidents based on accident statistics of Turkish or foreign flagged ships that 
operate in Turkish or international waters. For this purpose, it has been used Formal 
Safety Assessment Method and accident data of Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. This workout comprises accident 
data from 2001 to 2012. 
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MAKİNE DAİRESİ YANGINLARININ BİÇİMSEL EMNİYET 
DEĞERLENDİRMESİ 
ÖZET 
Genellikle risk denilince ilk akla gelen şey, olumsuz bir durumun ortaya çıkmasıdır. 
Olumsuz durumlar ise insan hayatını kötü yönde etkilemektedir. Risk belirlenirken, 
zaman aralığı, bu zaman aralığındaki sıklık ve riskin oluşturabileceği etkiler önemli 
parametrelerdir. Riskin nasıl kontrol edilebileceği risk yönetiminin temelini 
oluşturmaktadır. Risk yönetiminin önündeki en büyük engel ise bilinemez veya 
öngörülemez olaylardır.  
Risk, genellikle geçmiş kötü veya kazayla sonuçlanmış olaylardan edinilen kazanım 
ve bilgiler ışığında belirlenmektedir. Risk yönetiminde, kaza veya olay raporları, 
tecrübeler ve uzman görüşleri önemli yer tutmaktadır. Riski yönetirken ana amaç, 
riskin engellenmesi, engellenemiyorsa da kontrol altında tutulabilmesi ve zararın 
minimum düzeye indirilebilmesidir. Bu yönden bakıldığında, riski de bir kazanç 
olarak görmekte fayda vardır.  
Risk, zamana bağlı olan bir kavramdır. Kazanç ve zararları da zamana bağlıdır. 
Riskin zamana bağlı olma olgusunun üzerinde durmakta fayda vardır. Şöyle ki, 
geçmişte yüksek risk teşkil eden olaylar günümüzde neredeyse hiç risk teşkil 
etmemekte veya artık minimum düzeyde risk teşkil etmektedir. Böyle olmasındaki 
ana etmenler, teknolojik ilerlemeler, düzenlenen ve yürürlükteki yeni kurallar, insan 
eğitimindeki payın artması ve bilgi birikiminin gün geçtikte artmasıdır. Ancak, 
teknolojinin ilerlemesiyle yeni risk alanları da ortaya çıkmıştır ve ortaya çıkmaya 
devam etmektedir. Buradan şunu çıkartabiliriz; “Risk her zaman var olmuştur ve var 
olmaya da devam edecektir.”. Bazı riskler ortadan kalkmıştır ama yeni riskler de 
hayatımıza girmiştir.  
Riskin etkilediği en önemli alanlardan birincisi insan hayatı, ikincisi çevresel 
etmenler ve üçüncüsü ise maddi etmenlerdir. Bu sıralamada, insan hayatı her şeyin 
üstündedir. Sırf maddi ve gelecek çıkarlar uğruna insan hayatını hiçe saymak ne 
mühendislik etiğine ne de insanlık etiğine sığmamaktadır. İnsan hayatını korumak 
için alınması gereken önlemleri belirlerken kural koyucu kurumlara ve cezai 
yaptırımlara gereksinim vardır. IMO (Uluslararası Denizcilik Örgütü) ve ILO 
(Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü) gibi kurumlar bu amaçlar doğrultusunda 
çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, IACS (Uluslararası Klas Kuruluşları Birliği) ve Lloydlar (Klas 
Kuruluşları) gibi kurumlar bu amaçlar için vardır. Risk yönetilirken hızlı kararlar 
almak ve bu kararları bir an önce yürürlüğe sokmak esastır. Bu nedenle bahsi geçen 
kurumlar düzenli aralıklarla toplanmakta, güncel riskleri belirlemekte ve bu risklerin 
bertaraf edilmesi için kararlar almaktadırlar.  
Riskler belirlenirken, risk değerlendirme metotlarına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. 
Günümüzde birçok risk değerlendirme metodu mevcuttur. Bunlardan bazıları, 
kontrol listelerini (checklist) kullanılarak birincil risk analizi, eğer olursa ne olur? 
(what if?), tehlike ve işletilebilirlik analizi (HAZOP), hata ağacı analizi (FTA), 
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normal sistemden sapma ve etkileri analizi (FMEA), tehlike analizi ve kritik kontrol 
noktaları (HACCP), biçimsel emniyet değerlendirmesi (FSA) gibi metotlardır. Bu 
yöntemlerin ötesinde, risk belirlenirken öncelikle olarak hangi risklerin ele alınacağı 
önem arz etmektedir.  
Risklerin belirlenmesinde rastgele değerlendirmelerde bulunmak en büyük 
hatalardan biridir. Riskler belirlenirken sistematik bir yaklaşımda bulunmak çok 
önemlidir. Böylelikle risk belirlenmesi daha objektif olmaktadır. Objektiflikle 
beraber risk belirleme stratejileri daha şeffaf olmaktadır. Objektif ve şeffaf 
yaklaşımlar ve değerlendirmelerle beraber, risklerin ve bu risklerin etkilerinin kural 
koyucu mekanizmalara benimsetilmesi daha kolay hale gelmektedir. Risklerin 
objektif olarak derecelendirilmesi bu aşamada en büyük adımdır. Tabii ki riskler 
belirlenirken ve bu riskler için önlemler öne sürülürken bu önlemlerin maliyet/fayda 
analizlerinin de yapılması gerekmektedir. Olaya buradan bakıldığında, risklerin 
belirlenmesi ve kontrol edilmesi problemi bir optimizasyon problemi olarak ele 
alınabilir.   
Risk kavramının geçmişine baktığımızda ise, ilk risk analizleri uzay ve nükleer enerji 
sektöründe yapılmıştır. Bundaki ana etmen, bu sektörlerde geçmişte çok büyük 
kazaların yaşanmış olması ve bu kazaların tekrar yaşanmaması ve de yaşanabilecek 
kazaların etkilerinin en aza indirgenmesi için bir şeyler yapmak gerekliliğidir. Risk 
kavramının denizcilik sektörünün literatürüne geçmesi ise biraz zaman almıştır. 
Geçmişte yaşanmış büyük kazalar ve 1988 tarihinde Piper Alpha açık deniz 
platformunda yaşanan ve 167 kişinin ölümüne neden olan faciadan sonra risk analiz 
yöntemlerinin denizcilik sektörüne de uygulanması yönünde Uluslararası Denizcilik 
Örgütü tarafından kararlar alınmıştır.  
Uluslararası Denizcilik Örgütü (IMO), denizcilik sektöründe denizde can, mal ve 
çevre güvenliğine yönelik kurallar koyan ve koyduğu kuralların uluslararası 
bağlayıcılığı olan bir uluslararası organizasyondur. Yaşanan kazalardan sonra, 
Uluslararası Denizcilik Örgütü (IMO) tarafından Biçimsel Güvenlik Değerlendirmesi 
(BGD) nin ele alındığı komisyonlar oluşturulmuştur. BGD; riskleri belirleyen, 
riskleri azaltmak için ise IMO’nun önerdiği önlemlerin maliyet/fayda analizini 
yapan, sonrasında ise organizyonların karar verme sürecinde destek sağlayan 
sistematik bir risk değerlendirme süreci olarak tanıtılmıştır.  
BGD; ilk defa Birleşik Krallık tarafından ülkenin açıkdeniz endüstrisindeki risk 
değerlendirme yaklaşımları baz alınarak önerilmiştir. 1993’te Birleşik Krallık Sahil 
Güvenlik Teşkilatı (UK’s Marine Coastguard Agency) nın önerisiyle, Denizcilik ve 
Güvenlik Komitesi (Marine Safety Committee-MSC) nin 62. toplantısında BGD ilk 
olarak ele alınmıştır. 2 yıl sonra 1995’te, MSC ‘nin 65. toplantısında BGD gündemde 
yüksek önceliğe sahip olacak şekilde karar alınmıştır. 1997’de, MSC’nin 68. 
toplantısında ve Çevre Koruma Komitesi (Marine Environment Protection 
Committee-MEPC) nin 40. oturumunda, “IMO’nun Karar Verme Sürecinde Biçimsel 
Güvenlik Değerlendirmesi’nin Uygulanması İçin Geçici Kılavuz” yayımlanmıştır. 
1997’deki kılavuz (MSC Circ. 1023) baz alınarak deneme uygulamalarından edinilen 
tecrübeler, MSC’nin 74. toplantısında ve MPEC’nin 47. oturumunda geçici 
kılavuzun yerine geçmiştir. Yeni kılavuz, “IMO’nun Karar Verme Sürecinde 
Biçimsel Güvenlik Değerlendirmesi Kullanımı İçin Kılavuz” olarak adlandırılmıştır 
(MSC Circ. 1023 ve MPEC Circ. 392, 5 Nisan 2002). Böylelikle risk kavramı ve 
risklerin yönetilmesi kavramı denizcilik literatürüne girmiştir.  
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Bu çalışmada ise, Türk ve uluslararası sularda çalışan, Türk ve yabancı bayraklı 
gemilerin yaşadıkları kazalara göre kazaların nedenlerinin, etkilerinin, sıklık ve 
şiddetlerinin belirlenmesi ile bu kazaların önlenebilmesi ya da azaltılabilmesi için 
öneriler vermek amaçlanmıştır. Bunun için Biçimsel Güvenlik Değerlendirmesi 
Metodu kullanılmıştır. Çalışma için T.C. Deniz, Ulaştırma ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı 
kaza verileri esas alınmıştır. Çalışma, 2001-2012 yılları arasındaki kaza verilerini 
kapsamaktadır.  
Çalışmanın ilk kısmında, risk kavramının ne olduğu, risk kavramının gelişimi ve 
tarihçesi, risk kontrolüne ilişkin metotlara yer verilmiştir. Risk kavramıyla ilgili 
literatürde ne gibi çalışmalara olduğu incelenmiştir.  
Çalışmanın ikinci kısmında ise tezin konusu olan Biçimsel Güvenlik 
Değerlendirmesinin (BGD) ne olduğu, literatürdeki yeri ve gelişimi, BGD üzerine 
yapılan çalışmalar, BGD’nin nasıl uygulandığı üzerine bilgiler verilmiştir.  
BGD metodu, güncel risklerin tanımlanması, risklerin sebeplerinin belirlenmesi, riski 
kontrol edebilmek için hangi önlemlerinin alınması gerektiği, alınacak önlemlerinin 
fayda-maliyet analizlerinin yapılması ve de eldeki sonuçlara göre karar verici 
mekanizmalara öneriler sunulması adımlarından oluşan sistematik bir metottur.  
Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde,  istatistiki değerler ve bu değerlere göre oluşturulan 
tablolara ve de bu tabloların yorumlanmasına yer verilmiştir. İstatistiki veriler, Türk 
veya uluslararası sularda seyreden Türk veya yabancı bayraklı gemilerin T.C. 
Denizcilik, Ulaştırma ve Habercilik Bakanlığı veri tabanında yer alan kaza verilerine 
dayanmaktadır.  
Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünü ise kaza verilerine dayanarak BGD’nin makine 
dairesi yangınlarına uygulanması esas oluşturmuştur. Eldeki kaza verileri ve 
raporları, ayrıca uzman görüşlere dayanılarak makine dairesi yangınlarının çıkış 
sebepleri belirlenmiştir. Bu sebeplerin sıklık/etki derecelerine göre risk matrisi 
oluşturulmuştur. Bu matrise dayanılarak en yoğun kaza sebepleri bulunmuştur. 
Sonraki aşamada ise bu kazaların nasıl kontrol edilebileceği belirtilmiş, kontrol 
seçeneklerine göre ise maliyet-fayda analizi yapılmıştır. Bundan sonraki aşamada ise 
çıkan en uygun sonuçlara göre kazaların nasıl azaltılabileceği belirlenmiş ve karar 
verici mekanizmalara öneriler verilmiştir.  
Çalışmanın son kısmını ise sonuçlar ve öneriler kısmı oluşturmaktadır. Bu kısımda 
BGD’nin çıkan sonuçlar incelenmiş ve gelecek çalışmalarda neler yapılabileceği 
konusuna değinilmiştir. 
Çalışmanın ek kısmını ise Haliç Tersanesi’nde bakımda olan Beyoğlu vapurunun 
makine dairesi resimleri ve yangın ekipmanlarının resimleri oluşturmaktadır. 
Beyoğlu vapuru personeli ve Haliç Tersanesi’ndeki mühendislerle makine dairesi ve 
burada çıkabilecek yangınlar üzerine görüşme yapılmış olup, uzman görüşler elde 
edilmiştir.  
Bu çalışmadaki ana amaç, gemideki güvenliği etkileyen gemi makine dairesindeki 
yangınların en önemli nedenlerini analiz etmek ve gemi makine dairesindeki yangın 
güvenliğinin nasıl artırılabileceğine dair rehberlik yapmaktır. Bu amaçla, gemi 
makine dairesi yangınları üzerine Biçimsel Güvenlik Değerlendirmesi’nin deneme 
uygulaması gerçekleştirilmiştir.  Ele alınan makine dairesi, standart ve insan 
kontrolündeki bir makine dairesidir. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In this workout, it is aimed to identification of causes, impacts, frequency and 
severity of machinery room accidents and is aimed to preventing or reducing to risk 
of accidents based on accident statistics of Turkish or foreign flagged ships that 
operate in Turkish or international waters. For this purpose, it has been used Formal 
Safety Assessment Method and accident data of Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. This workout comprises accident 
data from 2001 to 2012. 
In first section of this workout, it is given wide coverage to what is the concept of 
risk, evolution and history of risk concept, and methods for risk controlling. Also, it 
is examined literature study about risk concept.  
In second section, it is informed about what is the FSA, evolution and history of 
FSA, accomplished workouts and literature survey, and how FSA can be applied.  
In third section, it is given place to statistical data, tables and comments about tables. 
Statistical data is based on accident data of Turkish or foreign flagged ships that 
operate in Turkish or international waters. 
In fourth section, it is explained how FSA can be applied to machinery room fires 
based on statistical data. Causes of machinery room fires are determined in 
accordance with accident data and reports, and expert views. Risk matrix is 
generated with regard to frequency/severity degree of causes. Most encountered 
causes are determined with respect to this matrix. In next stage, it is indicated that 
how this accidents can be controlled and what is the cost/benefit of this controls. In 
last stage, it is aimed to how risk of accidents can be reduced with regard to optimum 
results and it is given recommendations to decision makers. 
In last section of this workout, results and recommendations are argued. Outcomes of 
FSA are analyzed and it is mentioned to what can be done in future workouts.  
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2.  RISK IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Risk Identification and Type of Risks 
Two basic concepts must be known to understand risk assessment: Hazard and Risk. 
“Risk” is a combination of consequences and probability of occurrence of a harmful 
event. “Risk” is defined in a very wide range from an insignificant event to an 
accident at the level of disaster. 
Risk explains effectively evaluated dangers considering future possibilities (Kuleyn, 
2005). Risk is defined in dictionary as possibility of encountering danger or incurring 
losses. (Kuleyn, 2005). 
The mathematical representation of the risk is; 
Risk = Probability of Occurrence (P) X Effect or Severity of Event (S) 
As mathematical formula suggests, risk has two components; these are probability of 
occurrence (frequency) and severity (impact) (Kuo, 1998). 
Concepts of risk and danger are principally used in the same manner. However, they 
are completely different from each other. Danger is a property or condition to cause 
damage under certain circumstances (Kuo, 1998), Risk is a combination of 
probability of occurrence of a defined danger and size of the effects of this formation 
(Kuo, 1998). 
It is unable to reset risk. However, it is possible to bring it the acceptable level by 
controlling. 
There is a variety of risks types. This risk types can be defined as; 
Total risk is the sum of identified risk and unidentified risk. 
Identified risk is a risk that is determined for a variety of analysis techniques. The 
first work at the stage of risk assessment, in practice, is to make the identified risk as 
the biggest part of the pie.  Time period and cost of analysis efforts, quality and 
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technology level of risk management program, are effective in the detection of a 
greater proportion of the risks. 
Concept of acceptable risk is not simple, as it seems at first. Acceptance of risk is a 
function of risk assessment and risk management. Some of the risks should be 
accepted. The decision of how much can be or cannot be accepted is within the area 
of competent authority. Risk is accepted, because it is wanted to take advantage of 
production that is made by activity that gives rise to the risk. However, the level of 
risk to the same extent for all activities is not required. This means that some risks 
are acceptable, while some risks are not acceptable to the same extent (Cadoglu, 
2000). 
Unacceptable risk is the risk that cannot be ignored. This is a subset of the identified 
risk that can be eliminated or controlled. Risk mitigation measures must be activated 
here. 
Undetermined risk is yet unidentified risk. It is real and important but it is also 
unknown and cannot be measured. Some risks cannot be determined ever. 
The remaining risk is the risk that is remaining after all risk management efforts. It is 
considered as risk. In fact, the remaining risk is sum of acceptable risk and 
undetermined risk. Accident investigations sometimes may reveal some previously 
undetermined risks (Cadoglu, 2000). 
2.2 Risk and Uncertainty 
Another concept that is closely related to the risk is uncertainty. Risk is often a 
concept measured based on statistical data that is related to probability of occurrence 
of an undesirable event. Uncertainty, however, is used in the absence of statistical 
data, is a concept that cannot be measured (Cagiran, 1997). 
Risk is a measure of the amount of uncertainty that exists. Therefore, to increase the 
amount of uncertainty means the increase of the probability of occurrence of the risk 
(Kuleyn, 2005). The uncertainty is not negative or positive alone. Risk is generally 
considered as negative result, but on the other hand, it is also possible to identify the 
risk concept with the opportunity concept. When uncertainties is converted into 
opportunities, they provide a positive contribution to the process outcomes (Kuleyn, 
2005). 
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2.3 Risk Management Process 
Sea freight, mostly as a type of transport without alternative, in the case of an 
accident it causes huge environmental disasters like explosion, fire, marine pollution 
if it is taken into consideration,  all need to do, to minimize the risks that may arise 
by using all the contemporary systems and devices that human beings has reached. It 
passes this way through “risk management”. 
Risk management is a discipline that aims to reduce uncertainty and negative effects 
of uncertainty to an acceptable level and it is a proactive approach that provides the 
prevention of problems before they occur. 
A ship that sails in the sea has a very large range of stakeholders. These are, Flag 
State, Port State, Coastal State, ship owner/renter, operator, cargo owner, ship crew, 
passengers, ports served, classification societies, other ships and crew of these ships 
etc. 
The biggest advantage of risk management, it can be done before accident occurs, 
and in this respect, it has an accident prevention feature. In this context, it is essential 
to be recorded and be evaluated of near misses in risk management. 
Risk management provides consistent, continuous and a basic way at every level of 
the process developed for identifying risk, assessing and controlling while improving 
performance. Individuals at all levels identify and control hazards throughout this 
process. Six digits of Risk Management Process are shown in Figure 1 (Cadoglu, 
2000).  
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Figure 2.1: Risk Management Process. 
1. Hazard Identification: Danger is defined as a potential or an actual situation that 
may result in loss of equipment or damage to its properties also may cause to death, 
personnel injury and malfunction of the task. 
2. Risk Evaluation: Risk is severity and probability of loss due to exposure to danger. 
Evaluation phase is a practice of quantitative and qualitative measurement values to 
determine the degree of risk related to a particular danger. 
3. Analysis of Risk Control Options: It investigates precise strategies and tools that 
degrading, reducing or eliminating the risk.  Effective control measures degrade the 
one of the three arms of risk, which is probability, severity and exposure). 
4. Decision-Making: Top executives select all of the controls relevant to the analysis 
of costs and benefits. 
Hazard 
Identification 
Risk 
Evaluation 
Analysis of Risk 
Control Options 
Application 
of Decisions 
Decision 
Making 
Surveillance 
and Review 
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5. Application of Decisions: When control strategies are selected, the development of 
an implementation strategy and application of this strategy with workforce level and 
management level is needed. 
6. Surveillance and Review: Risk management is an ongoing process throughout the 
lifecycle of the system, task or activity. Administrators\Leaders present control 
activities at all levels. If implemented decisions are already in place and right, the 
system itself will determine its effectiveness. 
2.4 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is an evaluation phase of risk-associated dangers. If it is known to 
impact of a danger on the work to be done and if it is estimated, that how it is 
formed, it is called as a risk not as a danger. 
Risk assessment in maritime industry is based on determination of dangers in a 
specific sea area, identification of hazards how often they emerged after the 
examination of these hazards, and then what would happen if the danger were 
occurred. After putting forward the main issues risk will come out. The second stage 
is to determine the level of acceptance of risks after the risk identification made. It is 
called as risk assessment.  
The possibility of an accident is proportional to the total probability defined as cause 
of danger.  
The possibilities can be determined by estimates or real numbers if available. 
Estimating numerically of an accident probability to the new systems or tasks may 
not be possible at the beginning of the planning process (Cadoglu, 2000). 
Hazard is determination of severity in terms of potential impact on human, 
equipment or task. Categories of severity are defined to provide a qualitative 
criterion for the worst accident expected that might arise from the personnel errors, 
environmental conditions, equipment deficiencies or procedure, system and sub-
system failures (Cadoglu, 2000). 
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2.4.1 Risk assessment methods 
Generally, there are two types of risk assessment method (Kuo, 1998). 
- Quantitative method 
- Qualitative method 
In quantitative method, it is used numerical values for probability of the treat, impact 
of the treat, and these values is processed by mathematical and logical methods to 
find out risk value (Ozkilic, 2005). Quantitative techniques, if data is convenient, are 
especially suitable for complex and high-risk programs. Techniques are used such as 
error and event trees for measurement. 
Qualitative method use descriptive values such as high, very high, medium, and 
small instead of numerical values when it is calculating and expressing the risk 
(Ozkilic, 2005). While doing a port’s risk assessment, a well-considered risk 
application in a comparative method will give permission to identify of high-risk 
application without the need to determine the exact value of the risk. With this 
approach, it has been got through to data that is used in determining the priority of 
risk control, this method is will be more useful for ports (MSANZ, 2004). 
2.4.2 Risk analysis 
Risk analysis is core part where mathematical operations and interpretations are done 
in risk assessment. Main risk analysis is shown below (Ozkilic, 2005): 
 Risk Map 
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 Job Safety Analysis (JSA) 
 What if? 
 Preliminary Risk Analysis Using Checklists 
 Preliminary Risk Analysis 
 Risk Assessment Decision Matrix 
a) L-Type Matrix 
b) Multivariate X-Type Matrix 
9 
 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
 Hazard Rating Index 
 Rapid Ranking, Material Factor 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – Failure Mode and 
Critically Effects Analysis (FMEA/FMECA) 
 Safety Audit 
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
 Cause – Consequence Analysis 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA): Preliminary hazard analysis is a qualitative risk 
assessment methodology prepared quickly which can be used as a model for studies 
that are more detailed or at final design stage. In this method, possible undesirable 
events is firstly defined then resolved separately. Each undesirable event or hazard, 
possible improvements and preventive measures are formulated. The identified 
hazards puts order and measures are taken in order of priority. Preliminary hazard 
analysis is applied in the early design phase by analysts, but it is not an adequate 
method of analysis alone. 
What if?: This method can be applied at any stage of operation and can be executed 
by less experienced risk analysts. The general question starts with “What if?” and it 
based on the answers given. Possible consequences of deficiencies are determined 
and recommendations are identified in each case by individual responsible. This 
method is an informal method because it depends on experience of teammates of 
various disciplines and its results are affected too much by experience of the 
members (Kuo, 1998). 
Preliminary Risk Analysis Using Checklists: The purpose of PRA is to assess by 
determining potentially hazardous components of system or process and is to 
determine more or less the possibilities of accident per potential hazard. Most likely, 
the purpose of this method is to quickly determine important problems can be 
occurred probable. Order to obtain efficient results in the use of checklist, it should 
be prepared by experienced professionals (Ozkilic, 2005). 
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Preliminary Risk Analysis (PRA): Preliminary risk analysis is a systematic method to 
analyze accidents can be occurred while performing an activity. 
It has been sought answer of that question to identify accident; “what kind of 
potential accidents may occur while performing this activity?” 
It has been sought answer of that question to identify the events that contribute to; 
“When doing this activity, what is the most important event contributing to the 
creation of this accident?” 
- Human error 
- Hardware fails or error 
- System error 
- Environmental error 
- Management weaknesses etc. 
It has been sought answer of that that question to identify preventive and mitigating 
protection; “While doing this activity, which engineering or management control is 
used to help in reducing frequency and severity of accident?”. 
- Administrative procedures, 
- Plans, 
- Education and information, 
- Equipment etc. 
Risk Matrix: Risk matrix is a document containing information about risks such as 
“likely to occur/effect to result” or “time interval/severity” (Kuleyn, 2005). Risk 
assessment matrix that is one of the most used approach, has been developed to meet 
the requirements of the system safety program. Matrix diagrams is an assessment 
tool which is used to analyze relationship between two or more two or more variable. 
L-Type Matrix: 5 x 5 Matrix diagrams (L-Type Matrix), in particular, are used to 
evaluate cause and effect relations. This method is simple to perform risk analysis, so 
it is ideal for the analysts, but it is not sufficient for all jobs that include different 
processes or have flow chart very different from each other and success ratio of 
method changes by analyst’s experience. 
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The other component at risk matrix is impact measure. Impact measure that will be 
used in risk assessment related to maritime operations at ports is dealt with four 
different points of view. These are (MSANZ, 2004); 
- Human risk, 
- Financial risk, 
- Environmental risk, 
- Stakeholders risk. 
Referred to fourth clause, losses that affect social stakeholders of port is calculated 
based upon potential commercial losses that will be occurred due to an incident. For 
example; a ship ran aground in the port will cause full or partial closure of port a 
significant period of time and it would lead to the possibility of commercial losses 
may occur (MSANZ, 2004). 
In Table 2.1, it has been given an example of standard risk matrix prepared for use in 
risk assessment will be done at ports. Together with this matrix, it will be graded by 
identifying risks, probability and impact categories that a port is faced with 
(MSANZ: 2004). 
Consequence 
C4 5 6 7 8 10 
C3 4 5 6 7 9 
C2 3 3 4 6 8 
C1 1 2 2 3 6 
C0 0 0 0 0 0 
Frequency F5 F4 F3 F2 F1 
Figure 2.2: Sample Risk Matrix. 
The figures indicated above matrix are defined as follows: 
0 & 1: Negligible risk (unimportant) 
2 & 3: Low risk 
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4 & 5: Moderate risk (ALARP) 
6: Rising risk 
7 & 8: Significant risk 
9 & 10: High risk 
Risks that are included in ALARP region of matrix are taken into consideration 
insofar costs permit. ALARP is a very helpful and numerically expressed concept for 
a quantitative risk assessment (Kuo, 1998). 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP): 
By chemical industry, it has been developed by taking into account special hazard 
potentials of this industry. It is a systemically brainstorming study. It has been asked 
certain structured questions, then in case of these events occurred or not occurred; it 
has been asked what kind of results come into being. Later, preventive protective 
measures are identified and after preventive measures have been taken, it is decided 
whether the remaining risk is acceptable or not. If the remaining risk is in an 
unacceptable level, actions must be identified (Ozkilic, 2005). 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): 
Concept of fault tree analysis (FTA), is designed for to carry out an assessment of 
security of intercontinental ballistic missiles targeting control system in 1964 at Bell 
Telephone Laboratories. 
This method is a technique that is based on deductive logic. FTA is a schematic 
representation of critical or major errors, causes and potential counter measures 
related to works done at an establishment. In FTA, it is revealed unwanted possible 
errors and causes by getting to the root of the unwanted event (Kuo, 1998). For 
example, the cause of a bulb is not lighted up: 
- Switch failure, 
- Power supply failure, 
- Blowing of fuse, 
- Loose weld 
- Bulb failure, 
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or may be a combination of these. Therefore, bulb is not lighted up; it is modeled by 
combining a logic or gate with indicated events. 
Taken measures to prevent a peak event are analyzed in detail.  Unwanted peak event 
is identified, then it is analyzed all factors that can cause this event are analyzed  
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA): Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is 
used for identification of potential error types and the classification of these type 
errors according to degree of detection and intensity at the process of product, design 
and service that are subject to the review. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis aims to 
determine consequences and severity of consequences by revealing possible types of 
error. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis is a technique that can be applied in order to 
prevent growth of problem.  
With this technique, the prediction of fatal errors and establishment of preventive 
actions are possible (Yilmaz, 2000). 
The discipline of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is developed by the U.S. Army.  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA): At first, event tree analysis has been involved in nuclear 
industry, later it is started to be implemented often in other sectors. Event Tree 
Analysis is a method that shows diagram of flow of results can be emerged after the 
occurrence of the event selected at first (Kontovas, 2005). Differ from fault tree 
analysis, this methodology uses inductive logic (Ozkilic, 2005). 
The left side of the diagram is connected with the initial event; the right side of it is 
connected with damage case of factory/enterprise; the top side of it defines the 
system. If the system is successful, the road goes up side; if not, it goes down side 
(Kontovas, 2005). 
Logic of event tree analysis is opposite to the logic of fault tree analysis. This 
method can be used on continuous systems or systems in “standby” mode. 
2.5 Determination of Hazards 
Determination of the hazards forms the basis of all Risk Management process. Of 
course, if hazards cannot be identified, they cannot be controlled. The effort used to 
identify hazard will be reflected in a positive way to all Risk Management process 
(Cadoglu, 2000).  
14 
Hazards and factors that cause them are determined by shortcomings that will be 
corrected and definition of needs for task or system. The list of hazards that are 
related to each phase of stages or operations of business management are done 
(Cadoglu, 2000). 
The lists of reasons that are related to all kind of hazards that are specified in hazards 
list are done. A hazard may be due to several reasons. In any case, it tries to find out 
the real reason. 
2.6 Decision Making 
The decision maker chooses the preferences of control after obtained information 
about possible controls. This is not a temporary decision. Decisions are given due to 
awareness of the hazards and knowledge about how much the hazard control is 
important in achieve the task or not achieve the task (cost/income analyze). The 
decision maker should allocate resources in order to control the risk. Within the 
framework of risk reduction, continue to apply control measures for a small 
percentage of plus efficiency, after that point it enters in the process of that cost is 
not too high (Cadoglu, 2000).  
It is important to remember that the goal is not the lowest risk level; it is most proper 
risk level that is beneficial for enterprise.  
2.7 Application of Decisions 
When the decision was given, the existing resources should be available to complete 
certain controls. A part of the application phase of the control preferences is to 
inform the staff about the results and the next decisions. If there is a dispute, 
managers (decision makers) have to make a logical explanation.  
In order to maintain the effectiveness of Risk Management, Risk Controls must be 
continuous. This means that in order to gain a lot at one time, the responsibility is to 
maintain. 
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2.8 Surveillance and Review 
The last stage of Risk Management Practices is a stage that is determined the 
activities performed during the phase of Risk Controls. This phase includes three 
elements. The first of this, is to observe the effectiveness of risk control; the second 
of this, is to identify the needs for re-evaluation of the conditions affecting all of the 
task or a part of the task that is originated from unexpected changes, the third of this, 
is to learn a lesson from part of future activities that may be similar or identical 
nature whether positive or negative.  
Effective implementation of corrective and preventive patterns of movement, and in 
order to explore the new hazards, the feedback system should be established. When 
deciding on the adoption of a risk, these decision elements (benefit and cost 
comparisons) should be recorded. This process, when an accident or negative results 
have become real, is provide to revision of risk decision process for see the result of 
changes in procedures and techniques or where mistakes can be made. Without 
having a feedback policy (system), it cannot be with the ease of knowing that 
presumptions are not certain or they contain small errors or they are totally wrong  
(Cadoglu, 2000). 
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3.  FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
3.1 Development and Description of Formal Safety Assessment 
Analysis of risk was the main concern of energy and aviation sectors before its use in 
maritime sector. Purpose of using risk analysis methods is the reducing the risk 
factor before the accident occurs and preventing accidents as far as possible.  
In the early 1970s, risk assessment methods was applied in nuclear energy sector. 
But its first practice was taken part after 1979 Tree Mile Island nuclear accident 
occurred. After that accident, risk analysis methods for nuclear energy plants has 
been applied considerably. 
In the early 1980s, NASA was introduced first risk assessment criteria for its Apollo 
space program.  After the Challenger accident in 1986, NASA was developed 
Quantitative Risk Analysis method, after a while two astronaut was tasked with 
working on this method. In addition, NASA is the first organization that developed 
Quantitative Risk Analysis Software-QRAS (Kontovas, 2005) 
Concept of risk analysis methods has been gone into maritime sectors literature late 
compared to other sectors. Between 1980 and 2001, 1377 people was seriously 
wounded and 367 people was lost their lives in maritime industry. In this period, 
most important accident that cause to 167 people was lost their lives is Piper Alpha 
offshore platform disaster in 6 June 1988. After that accident, risk assessment 
methods has become very important (Kontovas, 2005). It has been discovered 
inadequate managerial methods cause to chain reaction of faults, because of this 
accident happened. Also fire instability of platform caused to unpreventable events. 
When this accident evaluated in the manner of risk management, it brought into 
question that how parameters that are independent from each other come together 
and cause to a disaster. Probability of occurrence of dangerous accidents that are 
originated from simple accidents occurred in a sequence was examined (Pate-
Cornell, 1993). 
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Scientific and technological advances brought development in design and 
construction areas in cargo vessels. Safer, cheaper and faster transportation systems 
came forward by development of world maritime trade. By spread out of this 
systems, the need of ships that have more tonnage capacity was increased. The 
bigger vessels caused to more operational expenditures, and as a consequence of this, 
safety on the ships has been decreased (Akyildiz, 2012). 
In past accidents, incidents like “load shift”, “personnel injury”, “collision”, 
“structural failures”, “pollution” caused to accidents. In category of accident type, 
although “collision” and “grounding” has been taken up great part, “fire” 
considerably caused to dangerous accidents, loss of life and property (Henley, 1992). 
When type of accidents is handled, most of accidents has become real due to “cargo 
load”. Statistics show that eventuated accidents was arisen from “human errors”. 
Another characteristic of cargo vessels is its rare voyage in ballast condition and its 
short overnight stay in ports (Akyildiz, 2012). 
It has been focused on safety of cargo vessels in last 15 years. Because most serious 
accidents was happened in this period. As a result of this accideents, IMO has begun 
to apply risk management process called as Formal Safety Assessment to prevent 
accidents. For IMO, Formal Safety Assessment is a risk management and helping 
tool to do cost/benefit analysis of practiced options to reduce or remove risks that are 
existed or have potential to occur (Akyildiz, 2012). FSA firstly introduced by United 
Kingdom and it is based on risk assessment methods applied in maritime sector of 
UK (MSA, 1993). IMO firstly examined FSA at 62. Session of MSC at the request of 
MCA in 1993. 
In 1993, MCA proposed a method consist of five steps called Formal Safety 
Assessment at the 62. Session of IMO. A working group was established by IMO 
because of FSA was never applied on a ship before.  
In 1995, MSC agreed on FSA has priority on its agenda. In 1997, it decided to 
creation of a temporary guide to apply FSA at the 68. Session of MSC and the 40. 
Session of MPEC (IMO 1997). FSA guide was updated with regard to experiences at 
the 74. Session of MSC and the 47. Session of MPEC. New guides was named as 
“Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment for Use in the IMO Rule-Making 
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Process” (IMO, 2002). In 2007, revised guidelines putted together as one at the 83. 
Session of MSC (IMO, 2007). 
FSA has been applied a variety of branches in maritime sector. Thus FSA applied on 
several ship types and also applied on several accident types. Below it can be found 
chronological sequence of researches related to FSA. 
Wang (2000), was proposed a draft of subjective safety assessment for the decision-
making step of FSA when a high degree of uncertainty exist.  
Wang (2001), was submitted a draft of FSA. In this draft, risk criteria in terms of 
ship safety and operational and design applications was available. 
Wang and Foinikis (2001), was written an article about FSA and its development in 
maritime industry. In this workout, accident statistics and design parameters of 
container ships and application of FSA to container ships was available. In addition, 
it has been showed to increase safety level in maritime industry based on a proactive 
and risk basis regime by using FSA methodology.  
Lee (2001), was applied FSA methodology in watertight sections of bulk carriers. 
This workout was came true in cooperation of Korean Lloyd and Seoul National 
University. At the end of research, 18 hazard identified and 32 risk control measure 
developed in order to decrease risks. 
Kristiansen and Soma (2001), was studied a research for development of safety in 
international maritime industry. In this workout, deficiencies of existing safety 
regulations was mentioned and systematic safety management and adaptation of FSA 
was proposed. Emergency evacuation was proposed as a case. 
Roberts and Marlow (2002) was investigated effect of various risk factors on 
structural failures of bulk carriers. At the end of investigation, it was determined 4 
independent risk factor and it was used for safety of bulk carriers.  
Lois (2004), was done researches that FSA could be applied to passenger ships. 
Research included application of FSA to passenger ships and development of FSA. A 
case study was done for passenger ships. 
Fang (2005), was done a study for application of FSA to prevent human errors in 
ship operations. Navigation simulations was used for this study.  
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Kontovas and Psaraftis (2006) was exercised on practices to develop FSA method. It 
was an objective and transparent study.  
Hu (2007), was done a study about quantitative risk assessment and modelling 
included criteria of importance level and frequency in ship navigation. Risk 
assessment model that forms from fuzzy logic frame was originated from 5 factor 
consist of accident characteristics. It was proposed that this model could be evaluated 
under the topic of ship navigation in order to decrease human error. 
As a result, FSA has been used from the early 1990s to nowadays in maritime 
industry. It has updated and reviewed as time goes by. 
3.2 Formal Safety Assessment Method 
Formal Safety Assessment is described by IMO as: FSA is a systematic methodology 
considering risk analysis and cost/benefit assessment purpose of safety of human life, 
environment, health and maritime (IMO, 2007). 
There are significant differences between FSA and Safety Case Approach. SCA is 
based on application of safety precautions for certain type of ships. But FSA is 
applied for certain dangers and general type of ships. Also two methods adopt same 
philosophy (Wang, 2001). 
FSA is a helping tool which takes part in development of new safety regulations or 
analysis of old regulations and by this means it equilibrates between technical and 
operational issues (Dasgupta, 2003). 
Most basic feature of FSA that is separating it from other risk assessment methods is 
its philosophy. In other risk assessment methods, it has been questioning that “Where 
did mistake do? How can it be fixed?” In FSA methodology, the purpose is the 
prevention of accident before it has happened. And so it has been questioning that 
“Where can fault exist? Which safety measures should take in order to prevent 
accident?” (IACS, 2008). 
3.3 The Purpose of Formal Safety Assessment 
The purpose of application of FSA in maritime industry is to do a general analysis to 
increase safety in maritime industry upon ship design, supervision, operation and 
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navigation. FSA has an important role in safety of maritime industry by using as a 
tool to developing existing regulations or making a major contribution on addition of 
new regulations to existing ship design, engineering techniques, ship operation and 
control, safety management standards and regulations (Fang, 2005). 
FSA has been developed as a helping tool in decision-making process by IMO. By 
means of FSA, decision-making procedures become more rational, provide 
prospective and holistic approaches and consequently a decision-making draft which 
takes politically a small space and prevents temporary solutions has been constituted. 
FSA provides trustable information about risk of hazards, risk control options, cost 
and benefit of this options for the development of decisions taken in risk 
management stage (IACS, 2008).  
3.4 Basic Definitions 
Threat; is the potential for harm or damage to the employees, the workplace and the 
environment due to physical imperfections of working environment and improper 
behavior of people. 
Hazard; is defined as physical injury, death, disease, loss of property or equipment 
and any kind of loss arising from this. 
Risk; is combination of results and probability of occurrence of a harmful event that 
may occur. Risk is defined in a very wide range from a minor incident to an accident 
at the level of disaster. 
Risk Management; is systematical application of policies, experiences and resources 
devoted to evaluation and control of risks that are related to human life and 
environmental safety.  
Due to prepared report in accordance with resolution taken at the 244th meeting of 
Board of Directors of International Labor Organization (ILO), risk is defined as 
“Probability of occurrence of an undesired event in a certain period of time or under 
circumstances, frequency and probability with respect to environmental conditions”; 
risk management is defined as “All attempts to improve and maintain work safety 
measures in an organization (Ozkilic, 2005). 
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Risk Assessment; is a study using qualitative and quantitative methods in order to 
reveal, eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) risks that are originated from 
working environment and conditions or dangers arising from the existing 
environment in a systematic way. 
In Occupational Health & Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS 18001), risk is defined 
as combination of probability of occurrence of an identified hazardous event and the 
result of it; risk management is defined as decision-making process whether the risk 
is tolerable or not and as a process of calculation of the magnitude of the risk. 
According to Turkish Standards (TS) 12100:2010 (Safety of machinery - General 
principles for design - Risk assessment and risk reduction), risk assessment is a 
number of logic step that allows systematically revision of hazards. 
Formal Safety Assessment is defined as identified hazards, assessed risks and 
methods of action that has been decided to manage these risks. 
Qualitative techniques; define risk with descriptive terms such as high, medium or 
small. 
Quantitative techniques; digitize risk and calculate risk depending on the numerical 
definitions such as error count of equipment, human error and so on.  
Accident; is undesired event that led to death, damage to health, injury, damage, loss 
or other adverse losses.  
Event; is a situation that cause an accident or with the potential to cause an accident 
(Ozkilic, 2005). 
Safety; is a situation that there is no risk of damage, loss. Stay away from 
inadmissible risk of damage (ISO / IEC Guide). 
Hazard Identification, in accordance with OHSAS 18002, is recognition that there is 
a danger and is identification of the characteristics of it. 
3.5 Formation Theories of Accident 
Accident can be defined as an event that becomes suddenly, unwanted and 
unplanned, often cause to death, injury or damage to property or accident are events 
that come in suddenly out of control after a phenomenon previously unknown occurs 
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and that damage to the physical integrity of the person or damage to the property. 
Here are some theories below to gain a perspective (Ozkilic, 2005): 
Single Factor Theory: This theory comes about concept suggests that an accident 
emerges because of single cause. If this only reason can be recognized and 
eliminated, accident will not repeat. 
Energy Theory: According to this theory, accidents mostly occur during the transfer 
of energy. This energy discharge rate is important because the larger the discharge 
energy, the greater the potential for damage. 
Human Factors Theory: This theory bonds accidents to chain of events caused by 
human error. The theory contains three important factors leading to human error: 
Overload, not-suitable response and untimely activities. Accidents originated form 
human error is based on many factors. Of course, reasons such as lack of education, 
out of keeping with work, incompatibility, lack of knowledge, inexperience, 
tiredness, being excited or upset, inattentiveness, carelessness, listlessness, looseness, 
lack of skill and illness, and so on., or have failed to comply with the rules in spite of 
all, are among the main reasons depending on human factor. 
Accident / Incident Theory: This theory is expanded form of human factors theory. 
In addition, it reveals new elements such as ergonomic deficiencies, decision of 
making mistake and system errors.    
System Theory: Theory reviews any situation that an accident may occur as a system 
consisting of three components: human, machine and the environment. 
Combination Theory: It argues that a single theory alone could not explain all the 
events. According to this theory, the actual cause of accidents can be achieved with a 
combination of two or more models.  
Multi – Factor Theory: Accident is analyzed and evaluated together with the many 
factors. This theory and analysis methods are accepted and implemented by many 
experienced health and safety experts. Accidents are multi-factors and are occurred 
as a result of a chain of errors, sub-standard practices, the formation of sub-standard 
conditions. 
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Domino Effect: Events in this theory are described in analogy with lower each other 
by ordering five dominoes in a row. Any accident occurs as a result of back-to-back 
arrangement of five main causes at least. This is called “Chain of Accident”. 
Unless one condition is not occurred, the next one does not occur and unless chain is 
not completed, accident will not occur. 
3.6 FSA Methodology 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is composed of five steps, according to the FSA 
guidance document prepared by the IMO is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: FSA Methodology (Akyildiz, 2011). 
1. Identification of hazards 
2. Assessment of risks 
3. Risk control options 
4. Cost – Benefit analysis 
5. Recommendations to decision-makers 
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Figure 3.2: Flowchart of FSA Methodology (Akyildiz, 2011). 
Before starting to Formal Safety Assessment, decision-makers make identification of 
obstructive problems related to topic. Purpose of defining problem, is to make in-
depth review to make a careful analysis. 
According to International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), the flow 
chart of FSA methodology is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Step 1; Identification of Hazards: Hazard identification stage is the most important 
step in risk management and it is different from other stages. It is objectively analysis 
of effects that may cause potential harm or damage in system or organization. The 
purpose of this step is to list dangers, to associate with scenarios and to cascade 
according to level of risk. In this step, experiences of experts and data banks 
generated with obtained knowledge from past incidents are effective factors in 
achieving results (Kontovas, 2005). 
Step 2; Risk Assessment: The possibilities combined with most important scenarios 
that are defined are being explored in the previous step.  In the second step, once 
again, it is needed to emphasize the use of the word probability. If there is no data in 
hand relevant to the issue before, the calculation is performed taking into account the 
possible approaches. Most of the time, the focus is on high risk factors at this stage. 
Overall, “Fault Tree” or “Result (Event) Tree” is generated by the resulting data 
(MSC Circ.1023). 
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Step 3; Risk Control Options: To focus on the subject is within the framework of a 
control. In addition, as results of experiments or measurements are made, definitions 
are made in order to completely eliminate the risk or reduce the possibility of 
occurrence/the frequency. With re-evaluation of second step (risk assessment step), 
more effective results can be obtained (MSC Circ.1023). 
Step 4; Cost-Benefit Analysis: For the implementation of each risk control option in 
the previous step, cost and benefit assessment is evaluated. By doing comparison as a 
result of assessment was done, classification is done according to needed cost to 
prevent disaster (Kontovas, 2005; MSC Circ.1023). 
Step 5; Recommendations to Decision-Makers: This step should include comparisons 
of all possible risk reduction options and risk reduction options based on 
effectiveness of their costs. As a result of this comparison, Acceptable or Negligible 
results should be presented to decision-makers. All Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
should be calculated and should be at an acceptable level.  
FSA is not to decide, is to produce decision. The FSA has its own limitations. FSA is 
not a magic wand to solve all security problems in the maritime industry or to 
eliminate all risk factors and to make decisions. In any case, the outputs have been 
limited to the inputs and processes done are parallel with this. In the other hand, FSA 
is a valuable and valid tool to produce decision for IMO (Kontovas, 2005). 
Acceptance of risk existence where human activities has existed is not a fatalistic 
approach, it is only the acceptance of a truth. When safety aims, it must be accepted 
that there is always a risk to a certain extent. In other words, it must be complied 
with the following principles in safe approach: 
Phase 1 What can go wrong?  Hazard Identification 
Phase 2 How often does it be? Risk Analysis, Frequency,  
How bad could it be?   Probability, Impact 
 Phase 3 How can it be improved? Risk Control Options 
 Phase 4 How much does it cost? Cost Assessment 
   How much does it cost more? 
 Phase 5 Is it worth to do all these? Tips 
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3.6.1 Step-1 identification of hazards 
According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, meaning of the word ‘Hazard’, is the 
occurrence of an event that is unplanned and unthought-of before.  
According to IMO MSC/CIRC 1023, Hazard is defined as potential threats to human 
life, human health, property or environment. 
The aim of Hazard Identification is to list the dangers, to associate with the scenarios 
and to cascade according to level of risk. In this step, experiences of experts and data 
banks generated with obtained knowledge from past incidents are effective factors in 
achieving results (Kontovas, 2005)  
Hazard Identification covers systematic identification of hazards and determination 
of incidents or costs resulted from this hazards.  
Identification of hazard is always being a factor that has been obtained because of 
strong and effective punishment experience.  
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is the most effective hazard identification 
(HAZID) method used in the maritime industry. 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) can be defined as an examination of impact of 
hazard over activities/processes. This process is done by an experienced team that is 
consisting of independent groups and an independent leader who manages and guides 
these groups.  
The strength of HAZOP (Kontovas, 2005); 
- It has been emerged as a result of an in-depth analysis. And its advantages 
and disadvantages are well known. 
- The user is to be formed using the expertise of personnel. 
- It is a systematic and versatile study and it includes any kind of hazard. 
- It is effective against all technical and human-caused errors. 
- It includes advanced formulas as well as being a safety guide. 
- With the discipline and organization provided from environment, working 
team reveals various solutions and ideas. 
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The weaknesses of HAZOP (Kontovas, 2005):  
- The success of this study depends on the level of knowledge of the team 
leader and the team, and level of the work. 
- Hazard identifications produced during operation are those that affect the 
process, it does not contain other types of hazard. 
- To do an effective and useful study, it should be got rid of intermediate 
procedures and avoided from details. This is not possible in practice. 
- Documents length (to ensure that a complete record). 
The first step to improve the safety of any waterway in planning is to collect the data 
that belongs to appropriate field in a healthy way. Other required information like 
date of accident, severity (the number of people that is killed and wounded), type 
(conflict, from rear (stern), from front, from side, vehicle/vehicle, vehicle/fixed 
object conflict/collision etc.), lighting, navigational aids related problems etc. should 
be collected from accident reports.  
In maritime industry, matrix approach foundation of risk assessment facilitates the 
comparison of risk levels. Risk matrices provide great benefit to downgrade to 
simplify sophisticated approaches.  
Risk = Probability of Occurrence (P) X Effect or Severity (S) 
Risk = Probability X Consequence 
Risk Index = Frequency Index + Impact Index 
3.6.2 Step-2 risk assessment 
Risk Assessment, is a comprehensive process to make a decision about estimation of 
the magnitude of risk and about risk can be tolerated or not.  
Within the framework of existing controls, high-risk areas in terms of probability and 
consequence are determined. A series of result can be considered, the probability and 
impact estimation are done to produce an estimation of level of risk. Many 
methodologies is available for making risk analysis, the most appropriate one is 
selected. Risk analysis is performed with the use of quantitative or qualitative 
methodologies (Ozkilic, 2005). 
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The purpose of the second step is to define the distribution of risk. To do this, in 
order to identify and assess the factors affecting the degree of risk, the work is done 
on high-risk areas. Another purpose of this is to establish a connection between 
occurrence and frequency of accidents for IMO’s decision-makers. In risk 
assessment stage, to decide on the acceptability of risk, a comprehensive decision is 
making on the importance of the risk. 
To show diagrammatic distribution between different accident categories and their 
sub-categories, Risk Distribution Trees are used. Causes of accidents and stages of 
development of accidents are shown using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event 
Tree Analysis that is widely used in FSA study. In addition, other enhanced 
techniques can be used. Risk analysis methods are examined in detail before. 
Fault tree (FTA) methodology are logical diagrams showing the relationship between 
the causes of events that are single or in combination, likely to be occurred. This 
method is a technique based on deductive reasoning. Fault tree is to define paths of 
errors and is to define ways will cause physical and human-induced errors 
FTA is an analyst technique that focuses on a particular error event. If two or more 
lower-level event causes to occurrence of a higher-level event, this is described with 
a logical diagram too (MSC/Circ 1023). 
Event Tree (ETA) analysis is used for analyze of effects of unexpected events, errors 
and accidents. Because of it shows the pre-accident and post-accident situations, it is 
the main technique used for analysis of results. 
The left side of the diagram is connected with the initial event, the right side of the 
diagram is connected with the damage case in enterprise and the top side of the 
diagram defines the system. If the system is successful, the way goes up, if not, it 
goes down. Success or failure path leads to variable-sized results (MSC/Circ 1023). 
The logic used in event tree analysis is opposite to the logic used in fault tree 
analysis. Unlike the fault tree analysis, this methodology uses inductive logic. 
In risk assessment, measures of frequency of events are determined in two ways. The 
first of this method, to use the statistical data of events have occurred in the past, 
other method is to utilize the frequency index. The first way is usually preferred and 
used by the IMO. 
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3.6.3 Step-3 risk control options 
It is the discussion of measures to be taken regarding the assessed risks. Risks 
normally can be reduced by one or several security measure. Reduction in risks 
occurs on results or on probability of occurrence. Control measurements can be done 
through “Engineering Control” or “Administrative Control”. “Engineering Controls” 
refers to protection methods, equipment such as barriers and “Port Control System”. 
“Administrative Controls” refers to the path of the publication of articles such as safe 
operating procedures, safety and security systems. 
Necessary changes related to identified risk mitigation and control measures are put 
into practice, but the control measures primarily reflect the principle of the 
elimination of hazards and risk. If risk cannot be eliminated, it can be mitigated. 
Implementing control measures take a long time, because it may be needed to the 
purchase of education, hardware or hardware changes due to the resistance to 
change.  
3.6.4 Step-4 cost-benefit analysis 
The aim of this step is to perform cost and benefit assessment for application of each 
risk control options in the previous step. As a result of evaluation made, 
classification is done based on needed cost for preventing the disaster by comparison 
(Kontovas, 2005). 
Sought answer to the question in step 4; 
“How much will it cost and to what extent this cost will improve the situation?” 
Cost-benefit calculation should be comprehensive as wide as possible. In general, 
cost includes expenses incurred during the life of the system and includes the initial 
costs. The benefit rises in value when risk decreases (Kontovas, 2005). 
Cost is often dependent on excessive use of monetary units; benefit is dependent on 
the prevention of the loss of a ship, environmental and economic factors. 
Unless enterprises cannot determine the true cost of accidents or do not have this 
awareness, to reduce or prevent accidents is not possible. 
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By this kind of analysis, it is calculated total benefits of regulatory measures; these 
benefits are compared with the total costs; thus, it arises that whether the 
arrangement is worthwhile or not. 
After the Cost-Benefit estimate, this data must be associated with risk reduction. 
3.6.5 Step-5 suggestions to decision-makers 
The purpose of the last step is to contain comparison of all possible risk reduction 
options and risk mitigation options based on effectiveness of their costs. As a result 
of this comparison, Acceptable or Negligible results are presented to decision-
makers. All Formal Safety Assessment should be in a calculated and acceptable 
level. 
The most important recommendations for risk control options; 
- What is the impact of cost? 
- Is the risk has been reduced to the desired level? 
Health and Safety Executive of England (HSE) has defended a connection between 
occupational health & safety and profitability for many years. Unless enterprises 
cannot determine the true cost of accidents or do not have this awareness, to reduce 
or prevent accidents is not possible. 
Health and Safety Executive of England developed a “Cost Methodology” to 
determine the cost of losses due to work-related accidents can be prevented and 
aiming to control the causes of the losses the firms faced. To achieve this goal, this 
methodology deals the “Work Accident” definition as very broad. Injury, disability, 
death or illness of the person doing job, losses related to harm to building, facility, 
equipment, materials or environment, or all unplanned events resulting in losses of 
work, all of them are evaluated as work accident (Ozkilic, 2005). 
Health and Safety Executive of England (HSE) states that risk should be considered 
in three states. The area of hazards that probability of occurrence of it is frequent and 
the area of risks that the effect of it is described as disaster are an unacceptable area. 
Regardless of the cost of assessed risks in this area, risk reduction process has to be 
done. Another area is a region where frequency of risks is too low and consequences 
of it are too unimportant at the same time. Risks in this region are at a level of 
broadly acceptable, any “risk reduction” process is unnecessary. The third zone 
32 
between other two zones is defined as ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) 
zone. In this region, the risks are taken into consideration to the extent of cost 
allowed. ALARP, for a risk assessment with quantitative approach, is a concept that 
is very helpful and can be expressed numerically. However, for a risk assessment 
with qualitative approach, ALARP’s position is more abstract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: ALARP (Akyildiz, 2011). 
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4.   ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
Most important step of FSA is the first step that determines accidents. Accordingly it 
is important to have accident statistics and determines accidents according to data. In 
this section, it will be dealt with accident data of Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. Scope of this work is involved 
between 2001 and 2012. 
Table 4.1: History-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
DATE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS 
2001 131 
2002 93 
2003 115 
2004 151 
2005 147 
2006 116 
2007 117 
2008 206 
2009 171 
2010 229 
2011 161 
2012 157 
TOTAL 1794 
FIRST 7 YEARS 124,2857143 
LAST 5 YEARS 184,8 
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Figure 4.1: History-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
If data is classified in terms of history, the number of accidents is maximum at 2010 
and is minimum at 2002. Causes of this situation are increasing volume of world 
trading and expansion of ship fleet etc. In addition, it is experienced %50 more 
accidents on average at last 5 years compared to first 7 years. It is shown a decrease 
in accidents after 2010 but still more than first 7 years. Increasing safety precautions 
is effective at this situation. 
Table 4.2: Region-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
REGION NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS 
ISTANBUL 786 
ÇANAKKALE 299 
IZMIR 298 
INTERNATIONAL 130 
ANTALYA 109 
SAMSUN 73 
MERSIN 72 
TRABZON 27 
TOTAL 1794 
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Figure 4.2: Region-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
In region-number of accidents graph, the number of accidents is maximum at 
Istanbul region and is minimum at Trabzon region. Accidents at Istanbul region form 
the app. %44 percent of all of accidents. Accidents at Izmır region form the app. %17 
percent of all of accidents also Accidents at Canakkale region form the app. %17 
percent of all of accidents. Causes of excess of accidents in Istanbul region are 
excessive trade volume in this region, excessive population, connection between 
Marmara and Blacksea, narrowness of Bosporus, constrained maneuvering etc. also 
Izmir region has an excessive trade volume. Canakkale region is a transition region. 
Because of this, accidents in this region is more than other regions. 
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Table 4.3: Type of Hazard-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
TYPE OF HAZARD 
NUMBER OF 
ACCIDENTS 
STANDING/GROUNDING 341 
COLLISION 273 
CAPSIZING 253 
FIRE 173 
OTHERS 129 
HAZARDOUS INCIDENT 97 
REQUEST FOR HELP 92 
DRIFT 89 
CRASH 87 
MEDICAL EVACUATION 76 
MACHINERY DAMAGE 59 
CONTACT 49 
MAN OVERBOARD 21 
LISTING 14 
DAMAGES TO SHIP OR EQUIPMENT 13 
MISSING: ASSUMED LOST 11 
FLOODING 6 
BANDIT ATTACK 5 
HULL FAILURE/ FAILURE OF 
WATERTIGHT DOORS/ PORTS, ETC. 
4 
EXPLOSION 2 
TOTAL 1794 
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Figure 4.3: Type of Hazard-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
In graph, most occurred type of hazard is grounding. Collision, capsizing and fire are 
other important type of hazards. Grounding forms the approximately %19 percent of 
all accidents, collision forms the %15 percent, capsizing forms the %14 percent and 
fire forms the %10 percent of all accidents. Main concern in this thesis is fire 
accidents. In fire accidents, main concern is fires in machinery room spaces. 
Machinery room fires are the most encountered type of fires in ships. 
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Table 4.4: Cause of Hazard-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
CAUSE OF HAZARD 
NUMBER OF 
ACCIDENTS 
UNKNOWN 487 
ADVERSE WEATHER 
CONDITIONS 
281 
MACHINERY FAILURE 168 
MEDICAL AID 141 
IMPERFECT SAIL 130 
FLOODING 93 
MANEUVERING ERROR 84 
PERSONNEL ERROR 61 
RUDDER FAILURE 58 
FIRE 55 
FLOUNDERING 44 
ELECTRIC CONTACT 35 
MAN OVERBOARD 34 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE 34 
DEATH INCIDENT 22 
LOAD SLIPPING 19 
ATTACK 17 
INATTENTION 14 
HELP 13 
EXPLOSION 4 
TOTAL 1794 
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Figure 4.4: Cause of Hazard-Number of Accidents (MTMAC, 2013). 
The cause of %28 percent of all accidents is unknown. After this, most important 
cause of accidents is bad weather conditions. Respectively, the causes of accidents 
are machinery failure, medical aid(injuries), and imperfect sail. 
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5.   APPLICATION OF FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT ON ENGINE 
ROOM FIRES 
5.1 Identification of Hazards 
Main potential hazards that cause to accidents are like below. In this section, 
statistical data of type of hazards and cause of hazards is taken into consideration. 
- Capsizing 
- Collision 
- Contact 
- Crash 
- Drifting 
- Fire and Explosions 
- Grounding 
- Listing 
- Machinery Failure 
- Medical Evacuation 
- Others 
Main potential hazards that cause to fire in machinery room spaces are like below. 
This hazards has been examined by an expert point of view and also has been 
originated from accident investigations and reports. 
- Crankcase Explosions 
- Gear Box Explosions 
- Scavenge Fires 
- Tank Explosions 
- Bunkering Explosions 
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Statistical data has been categorized in sub-topics. Each sub-topic has been examined 
by assigning risk level number based on expert point of view. By using of Risk 
Ranking Number (RRN), risk matrices have been formed. Due to below chart, some 
terms described as S1=Remote, S2=Occasional, S3=Likely, S4=Probable, 
S5=Frequent, F1=Negligible, F2=Minor, F3=Significant, F4=Critical, 
F5=Catastrophic. 
Table 5.1: Frequency/Consequence. 
Frequency (F) / 
Consequence 
(S) 
F1 
(Negligible) 
F2 
(Minor) 
F3 
(Significant) 
F4 
(Critical) 
F5 
(Catastrophic) 
S1 (Remote) 1 2 3 4 5 
S2 
(Occasional) 
2 3 4 5 6 
S3 (Likely) 3 4 5 6 7 
S4 (Probable) 4 5 6 7 8 
S5 (Frequent) 5 6 7 8 9 
Classification of importance level of hazards is done by like that:  
- Negligible: Minor financial loss, no environmental pollution and no loss of 
life/injuries 
- Minor: Moderate financial loss, minor environmental pollution and fire, the 
crew has been rescued 
- Significant: Serious financial loss, moderate environmental pollution 
- Critical: Loss of ship, serious environmental pollution, significant loss of 
life/injuries 
- Catastrophic: Loss of vessel, extreme environmental pollution, loss of live 
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Table 5.2: Rating/Result. 
Rating Result 
Negligible 
Minor financial loss, no environmental pollution 
and no loss of life/injuries 
 
Minor 
Moderate financial loss, minor environmental 
pollution and fire, the crew has been rescued 
 
Significant 
Serious financial loss, moderate environmental 
pollution 
 
Critical 
Critical: Loss of ship, serious environmental 
pollution, significant loss of life/injuries 
 
Catastrophic 
Catastrophic: Loss of vessel, extreme 
environmental pollution, loss of live 
 
If it can be dealt with potential hazard definitions, in terms of machinery room fires, 
events that have potential to cause accidents are; 
- Fuel oil 
- Lubricating oil 
- Hydraulic oil 
- Materials that are absorbed oil 
- Hot spots 
- Damaged or cracked pipes 
- Hot work in machinery room 
- Flammable materials 
- Electrical circuits 
- Lights 
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- Incinerators 
- Scavenge dirtiness 
- Bilges 
- Isolation of pipes 
- Static electric 
- Production faults 
- Human factor (Cleanliness, Not obey to rules etc.) 
Table 5.3: Result/Definition. 
Definition of Potential Hazards 
Result Definition 
Machinery Room Fire 
Fuel oil 
Lubricating oil 
Hydraulic oil 
Materials that are absorbed oil 
Hot spots 
Damaged or cracked pipes 
Hot work in machinery room 
Flammable materials 
Electrical circuits 
Lights 
Incinerators 
Scavenge dirtiness 
Bilges 
Isolation of pipes 
Static electric 
Production faults 
Human factor (Cleanliness, Not obey to rules etc.) 
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5.2 Risk Assessment 
Causes of machinery room fires should be examined with places that accident is 
happened. According to this, anchored ships at anchorage ground are called as 
“Anchored”, ships that pass through Bosporus or sail close to the anchorage places or 
ground called as “Near Cruise”, ships that sail in international waters or open seas 
called as “Distant Cruise”, ships that enter to anchorage places and ports called as 
“Entering to Port”, ships that exit from anchorage places and port called as “Exiting 
from Port”, ships that are under repair in shipyards called as “Overhaul”. 
Table 5.4: Risk Matrix. 
Machinery Room Fires 
Cause of Accident Anchored 
Near 
Cruise 
Distant 
Cruise 
Entering 
to Port 
Exiting 
from Port 
Overhaul 
Fuel oil F1S3=3 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F1S3=3 
Lubricating oil F1S3=3 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F1S3=3 
Hydraulic oil F1S3=3 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F1S3=3 
Materials that are 
absorbed oil 
F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 
Hot spots F1S3=3 F4S4=7 F4S4=7 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F1S3=3 
Damaged or cracked 
pipes 
F1S3=3 F4S4=7 F4S4=7 F3S4=6 F3S4=6 F1S3=3 
Hot work in 
machinery room 
F3S3=5 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F4S3=6 
Flammable materials F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 
Electrical circuits F1S3=3 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F1S3=3 
Lights F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 
Incinerators F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 
Scavenge dirtiness F1S3=3 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F1S3=3 
Bilges F1S3=3 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F3S3=5 F1S3=3 
Isolation of pipes F2S2=3 F4S4=7 F4S4=7 F4S4=7 F4S4=7 F2S2=3 
Static electric F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 
Production faults F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 F1S3=3 
Human factor 
(Cleanliness, Not 
obey to rules etc.) 
F2S3=4 F1S5=6 F1S2=2 F1S1=1 F1S1=1 F2S5=6 
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In this section, it is taken account of RRN values of 4 and more. RRN values that are 
below 4 have not much impact on general risk level. With regard to risk matrix, most 
encountered causes of machinery room fires are; 
- Fuel oil 
- Lubricating oil 
- Hydraulic oil 
- Hot spots 
- Damaged or cracked pipes 
- Hot work in machinery room 
- Electrical circuits 
- Scavenge dirtiness 
- Bilges 
- Isolation of pipes 
- Human factor 
5.3 Risk Control Options 
It must be plotted out that cause of accident - incident – accident – result of accident 
for all kind of accidents (Akyildiz, 2011) 
Do’s (cause of accident has happened and incident has not happened yet) 
- Training personnel for prevention of faults of personnel 
- Controlling machine and equipment 
- Controlling fire equipment 
Do’s (incident has happened and accident has not happened yet) 
- Providing adequate communication 
- Monitoring machine and equipment 
- Taking immediate precautions for safety 
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Table 5.5: Cause of Accident/Result. 
Fires in Machinery Room 
Causes of Accident Incident Type of Accident Result 
Fuel oil Failure 
Fire 
Material 
Damage 
Lubricating oil Failure 
Material 
Damage 
Hydraulic oil Failure 
Material 
Damage 
Hot spots Overheating 
Material 
Damage 
Damaged or cracked pipes Failure 
Material 
Damage 
Hot work in machinery room Inattention 
Lost of 
Personnel 
Electrical circuits Failure 
Material 
Damage 
Scavenge dirtiness Overheating 
Material 
Damage 
Bilges Inattention 
Material 
Damage 
Isolation of pipes Failure 
Material 
Damage 
Human factor Inattention 
Lost of 
Personnel 
Do’s (accident has happened and it must be suppressed before the situation became 
graver) 
- Informing other ships and state authority about accident 
- Activating fire suppression systems 
- Bringing fire fighting equipment to the accident place 
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- Intervening in fire 
- Taking safety precautions 
5.4 Cost/Benefit Assessment 
Doing cost/benefit assessment is crucial to show performance of FSA method. 
Cost/benefit assessment is done by forming a matrix, and it will be acquired some 
values from this matrix. In this case, maximum values are considered because these 
values indicate the indispensable necessary actions for preventing accident. 
It is a fact that score of precautions that have a high benefit value and have a low cost 
value at the same time are maximum in general. For example, training of personnel 
to preventing fault of personnel has a high cost/benefit value because it is cheap and 
it has a great benefit.  
Benefit is graded as, 1=very low benefit, 2=low benefit, 3=moderate benfit, 4=high 
benefit, 5=very high benefit. Cost is graded as too, 1=very low cost, 2=low cost, 
3=moderate cost, 4=high cost, 5=very high cost. Actions to be taken that has a 
benefit value of 5 and cost value of 1 are the most efficient precautions (Lois, 2004). 
Table 5.6: Benefit Scoring System. 
Degree of Benefit 
1 Very low 
Gaining very low favor 
from reducing risk 
2 Low 
Gaining low favor from 
reducing risk 
3 Moderate 
Gaining moderate favor 
from reducing risk 
4 High 
Gaining high favor from 
reducing risk 
5 Very high 
Gaining very high favor 
from reducing risk 
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Table 5.7: Cost Scoring System. 
Degree of Cost 
1 Very low 
Actions to be taken have a 
very low cost 
2 Low 
Actions to be taken have a 
low cost 
3 Moderate 
Actions to be taken have a 
moderate cost 
4 High 
Actions to be taken have a 
high cost 
5 Very high 
Actions to be taken have a 
very high cost 
When doing cost/benefit assessment, actions to be taken are defined and categorized 
as below: 
Training of personnel: Most important step to prevent faults that are originated from 
personnel is to inform personnel about actions to be done in the ship. Personnel has 
to have sufficient knowledge. Deficient topics must be identified and training of 
personnel about these topics is crucial.  
Training of fire fighting: Personnel has to have sufficient knowledge about fire 
fighting. If any deficient knowledge has been existed, personnel has to be educated 
about these topics. In this case, fire drills and practices are important. Fire drills show 
the missing points. To prevent fire in case of an emergency, fire drills must be done 
regularly. 
Controlling and monitoring engine and other equipments: Engine and other 
components of engine must be monitored and controlled regularly in order to be sure 
about it works properly. Chief engineer has to have sufficient knowledge about this 
topic. At this stage, log books are important. Log books have to be controlled 
regularly. All engine data has to be written to the log books.  
Inspecting and checking engine and other equipments before starting: Engine and 
other equipments must be inspected before operating. Log books have to be checked 
before engine starts. 
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Fire fighting: Advanced fire fighting equipment must be used in order to suppress 
fire. New technologies has great advantage nowadays, and clean, ozone-free and 
harmless fire fighting systems are existed. 
Inspecting pipes: All pipe system has to be checked and inspected regularly in certain 
time intervals. Damaged or cracked pipes can cause to the serious fire. In order to 
prevent heat discharge from pipes, isolation of pipes is important. Proper and 
certificied pipes and isolation materials have to be used in engine room. Also, sealing 
of pipes is important. Flanges and joints has to be inspected regularly. Most of the 
engine room fires stem from faults of flanges and joints.  
Inspecting engine room: Engine room personnel must inspect to the engine room 
properly. Scavenge dirtiness, uncleanness of engine room, hot spots, defective 
electrical circuits can cause to serious fires. Crew has to be sure that everything in 
engine room works properly. Engine room has to be keeped clean continuously.  
Table 5.8: Benefit/Cost Assessment of Fire. 
Fire 
 
Actions to be 
taken 
Value of benefit Value of cost Score 
Personnel 
Training 5 2 2,5 
Communication 
skills 
5 2 2,5 
Training of fire 
fighting 
5 3 1,6 
Training of 
communication 
5 3 1,6 
Drills 4 3 1,3 
Equipment 
Conventional 
fire fighting 
5 3 1,6 
Proper materials 
and isolations 
4 3 1,3 
Modern fire 
fighting 
5 4 1,25 
Good design 4 2 2 
Procedure 
Fire fighting 
knowledge 
5 2 2,5 
Controlling 
equipments 
4 2 2,5 
Monitoring 
engine 
3 1 3 
Cleanliness 4 1 4 
Ability to 
extinguishing 
fires 
5 3 1,6 
Fire warning 3 1 3 
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Due to table 5.8, a benefit/cost assessment of actions to be taken to prevent fires in 
engine rooms is made. Some actions that have a higher score than others are; 
- Cleanliness of engine room 
- Warning other ships and authorities 
- Monitoring engine 
- Controlling equipments 
- Fire fighting knowledge 
- Training of personnel 
- Communication skills 
- Good design 
Above actions have the higher score than other options. These actions have the 
priority to prevent fires in engine rooms. However, other options are important too.  
5.5 Decision Making 
Human factor is important in prevention of engine room fires. Some of the sanctions 
have to be applied to reduce fault of personnel. Training of personnel and training of 
communication skills are very important to prevent fires or reduce the impact of fires 
in case of emergency. If an accident has happened, minimum loss of lives and 
minimum cost of damage are aimed after accident. 
Personnel faults are grouped as; 
- Faults when giving decision 
- Lack of communication 
- Inattention of crew 
- Be absent at the place of duty 
- Misuse of equipments 
In case of emergency, role of personnel is important. If personnel does not act 
properly, serious accidents will become real. In this case, training of personnel is 
very crucial. 
Another cause of accident is lack of communication between personnel. If personnel 
have communication problems with each other or proper working conditions do not 
exist, risk of accident will grow. In this case, resolving issues between personnel and 
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providing keeping company with each other are essential matters. Also, lack of 
knowledge about ship and equipments increase the risk of accident considerably. 
Personnel has to have technical knowledge about using equipments and training of 
personnel for using equipment has to be given. 
Fire fighting equipment and fire fighting knowledge of personnel are other important 
matters. Dirtiness of engine room, negligence of monitoring engine, insufficient 
knowledge about fire fighting can increase the level of risk and severity of accident. 
A timely response to the fire, to keep engine room clean, to know well what to do in 
case of emergency are important parameters when preventing risk of fire or reducing 
impacts of fire.  
Another matter is the design matter. Designing engine room to provide comfortable 
working conditions, easy to access to the engine room and easy to escape from 
engine room is critical. Well-placed tanks and pipes will reduce the risk of fire.    
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this workout, it is aimed to identification of causes, impacts, frequency and 
severity of machinery room accidents and is aimed to preventing or reducing to risk 
of accidents based on accident statistics of Turkish or foreign flagged ships that 
operate in Turkish or international waters. For this purpose, it has been used Formal 
Safety Assessment Method and accident data of Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. This workout comprises accident 
data from 2001 to 2012. In addition, an interview with Halic Shipyard personnel was 
carried out. Machinery room of Beyoglu ferryboat was investigated and some photos 
was taken. It might be seen machinery room photos of Beyoglu ferryboat in 
appendix. 
The purpose of application of FSA in maritime industry is to do a general analysis to 
increase safety in maritime industry upon ship design, supervision, operation and 
navigation. FSA has an important role in safety of maritime industry by using as a 
tool to developing existing regulations or making a major contribution on addition of 
new regulations to existing ship design, engineering techniques, ship operation and 
control, safety management standards and regulations (Fang, 2005). 
FSA has been developed as a helping tool in decision-making process by IMO. By 
means of FSA, decision-making procedures become more rational, provide 
prospective and holistic approaches and consequently a decision-making draft which 
takes politically a small space and prevents temporary solutions has been constituted. 
FSA provides trustable information about risk of hazards, risk control options, cost 
and benefit of this options for the development of decisions taken in risk 
management stage (IACS, 2008).  
In this workout, it is explained how FSA can be applied to machinery room fires 
based on statistical data. Causes of machinery room fires are determined in 
accordance with accident data and reports, and expert views. Risk matrix is 
generated with regard to frequency/severity degree of causes. Most encountered 
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causes are determined with respect to this matrix. In next stage, it is indicated that 
how this accidents can be controlled and what is the cost/benefit of this controls. In 
last stage, it is aimed to how risk of accidents can be reduced with regard to optimum 
results and it is given recommendations to decision makers. 
Main potential hazards that cause to fire in machinery room spaces are like below: 
- Crankcase Explosions 
- Gear Box Explosions 
- Scavenge Fires 
- Tank Explosions 
- Bunkering Explosions 
If it can be dealt with potential hazard definitions, in terms of machinery room fires, 
events that have potential to cause accidents are; 
- Fuel oil 
- Lubricating oil 
- Hydraulic oil 
- Materials that are absorbed oil 
- Hot spots 
- Damaged or cracked pipes 
- Hot work in machinery room 
- Flammable materials 
- Electrical circuits 
- Lights 
- Incinerators 
- Scavenge dirtiness 
- Bilges 
- Isolation of pipes 
- Static electric 
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- Production faults 
- Human factor (Cleanliness, Not obey to rules etc.) 
After determining potential hazards, risk matrix has been formed. It is taken account 
of RRN values of 4 and more. RRN values that are below 4 have not much impact on 
general risk level. With regard to risk matrix, most encountered causes of machinery 
room fires are; 
- Fuel oil 
- Lubricating oil 
- Hydraulic oil 
- Hot spots 
- Damaged or cracked pipes 
- Hot work in machinery room 
- Electrical circuits 
- Scavenge dirtiness 
- Bilges 
- Isolation of pipes 
- Human factor 
When doing cost/benefit assessment, actions to be taken are defined and categorized 
as below: 
- Training of personnel 
- Training of fire fighting 
- Controlling and monitoring engine and other equipments 
- Inspecting and checking engine and other equipments before starting 
- Fire fighting 
- Inspecting pipes 
- Inspecting engine room  
56 
After forming a benefit/cost matrix, benefit/cost assessment of actions to be taken to 
prevent fires in engine rooms is made. Some actions that have a higher score than 
others are; 
- Cleanliness of engine room 
- Warning other ships and authorities 
- Monitoring engine 
- Controlling equipments 
- Fire fighting knowledge 
- Training of personnel 
- Communication skills 
- Good design 
Above actions have the higher score than other options. These actions have the 
priority to prevent fires in engine rooms. However, other options are important too.  
After that it is tried to give recommendations about accidents: 
Human factor is important in prevention of engine room fires. Some of the sanctions 
have to be applied to reduce fault of personnel. Training of personnel and training of 
communication skills are very important to prevent fires or reduce the impact of fires 
in case of emergency. If an accident has happened, minimum loss of lives and 
minimum cost of damage are aimed after accident. 
Personnel faults are grouped as; 
- Faults when giving decision 
- Lack of communication 
- Inattention of crew 
- Be absent at the place of duty 
- Misuse of equipments 
In case of emergency, role of personnel is important. If personnel does not act 
properly, serious accidents will become real. In this case, training of personnel is 
very crucial. 
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Another cause of accident is lack of communication between personnel. If personnel 
have communication problems with each other or proper working conditions do not 
exist, risk of accident will grow. In this case, resolving issues between personnel and 
providing keeping company with each other are essential matters. Also, lack of 
knowledge about ship and equipments increase the risk of accident considerably. 
Personnel has to have technical knowledge about using equipments and training of 
personnel for using equipment has to be given. 
Fire fighting equipment and fire fighting knowledge of personnel are other important 
matters. Dirtiness of engine room, negligence of monitoring engine, insufficient 
knowledge about fire fighting can increase the level of risk and severity of accident. 
A timely response to the fire, to keep engine room clean, to know well what to do in 
case of emergency are important parameters when preventing risk of fire or reducing 
impacts of fire.  
Another matter is the design matter. Designing engine room to provide comfortable 
working conditions, easy to access to the engine room and easy to escape from 
engine room is critical. Well-placed tanks and pipes will reduce the risk of fire.    
In conclusion, FSA is a very effective tool to identify hazards, assess risks, control 
risks, determine benefit/cost of control options, and give recommendations to 
decision makers. In this thesis, it is tried to explain how FSA apply to the engine 
room fires. Some outcomes from this method have been acquired. Most important 
and effective outcome is human factor. Reducing or controlling risks that are 
originated from human fault is very crucial. Controlling risks related to the human 
fault is very beneficial and cost-effective. But human factor is not a very objective 
matter. It is not transparent nor determinable matter. In future workouts, FSA should 
be relatable to the human factor. Fuzzy logic and artificial neural networks should be 
used. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Machinery room photos of Beyoglu ferryboat 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure A.1: Sprinkler System Tank. 
 
Figure A.2: Sprinkler Alarm System. 
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Figure A.3: Manifold system. 
 
Figure A.4: FM-200 Extinguishing System and N2 (Nitrogen) Activation Unit. 
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Figure A.5: Firefighting Clothes in Red Box. 
 
Figure A.6: Emergency Escape Breathing Device. 
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Figure A.7: Gun for Foam Making System. 
 
Figure A.8: Portable Extinguishers. 
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Figure A.9: FM-200 Alarm System. 
 
Figure A.10: Fire and Bilge Pump Boards. 
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Figure A.11: Fire Extinguishing Hose. 
 
Figure A.12: Fire and Bilge Pumps. 
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Figure A.13: FM-200 Tank. 
 
Figure A.14: Foam Tube. 
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Figure A.15: Sprinkler Control  System. 
 
Figure A.16: Fire Control&Safety Plan. 
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